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Abstract 
 
After some two decades of inattention, the issue of energy security once again moved to the top 
of the policy agenda in Germany in the mid-2000s.  After briefly achieving renewed prominence, 
however, it has been eclipsed in German energy policy, at least temporarily, by heightened 
concerns about climate change.  This paper explains the re-emergence of concerns about energy 
insecurity in recent years as well as the reasons for their subsequent overshadowing.  It describes 
the steps that have been taken during this period to promote German energy security, analyzes 
their adequacy, and identifies potential conflicts with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and other aspects of Germany energy policy.  It concludes that there are nevertheless 
good reasons to expect the issue of energy security to regain the attention of policy makers in the 
future. 
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Germany and Energy Security in the 2000s: Rise and Fall of a Policy Issue? 
 
1. Introduction 
After some two decades of inattention, the issue of energy security once again moved to the top 
of the policy agenda in Germany in the mid-2000s.  After briefly achieving renewed prominence, 
however, it has been eclipsed in German energy policy, at least temporarily, by heightened 
concerns about climate change.  This paper explains the re-emergence of concerns about energy 
insecurity in recent years as well as the reasons for their subsequent overshadowing.  It describes 
the steps that have been taken during this period to promote German energy security, analyzes 
their adequacy, and identifies potential conflicts with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and other aspects of Germany energy policy.  It concludes that there are nevertheless 
good reasons to expect the issue of energy security to regain the attention of policy makers in the 
future.1 
 
2. The Re-emergence of Energy Insecurity in the Federal Republic of Germany  
The current period is certainly not the first time that German political leaders have been 
concerned about energy security.  After World War II, the problem took the form of securing 
adequate supplies of coal.  Of even greater relevance to the contemporary situation is Germany’s 
experience in the 1970s, when as a result of the oil shocks, Germany’s energy security seemed to 
be acutely threatened.  For much of the 1980s and the 1990s, however, the issue of energy 
security evinced little attention from German policy makers or the German public.  What 
                                                          
1This paper draws on approximately two dozen interviews conducted in Berlin in June 2006 and June 2007.  
Interviewees included members of parliament and/or members of their staffs from the CDU/CSU, SPD, and Green 
party; officials in the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU), and the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt); and 
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prompted energy security to return, albeit only temporarily, to the top of the energy policy 
agenda in the mid-2000s?  One can point to a combination of medium- to long-term 
developments and dramatic political events. 
 
2.1. Background Developments 
The most important long-term development was the European Union’s and Germany’s growing 
dependence on energy imports, but especially on natural gas from Russia.  This issue was 
flagged at least as early as November 2000 by the European Commission, when it published a 
Green Paper titled “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply.”2  The paper 
pointed out that, should no measures be taken, the share of the Union’s energy requirements 
covered by imports would rise from the current 50 percent to 70 percent within 20 to 30 years.  
The paper also noted that 41 percent of natural gas imports came from a single country, Russia, 
and that that figure could rise to 60 percent as a result of membership enlargement and growing 
gas consumption.3 
 Although the Commission paper did not spell out the level of import dependence for each 
member country, the trends for Germany were similarly problematic.  After declining following 
the oil shocks, the overall share of energy from imports had been rising since the 1980s.  By the 
mid-2000s, this figure had reached 62 percent, not including uranium imports, and the 
government expected it to continue to grow as a result of declining coal production and the 
planned phase-out of nuclear power.4 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
outside energy policy experts. 
2European Commission 2001. 
3European Commission 2001, 21-23 and 40-41. 
4BMWi/BMU 2006a, 11. 
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 Germany was particular dependent on imports of oil and petroleum products, which 
amounted to 97 percent of domestic consumption.  By the mid-2000s, some 41 percent came 
from Russia or from Kazakhstan through Russian pipelines, and another 31 percent from Norway 
and the UK.5  Because of the fungibility of oil, much of which is transported by tanker, however, 
the concentration of such a high percentage of imports in just three countries did not raise 
alarms. 
 More troubling was the character of Germany’s large and growing dependence on 
imports of natural gas.  In the mid-2000s, Germany produced approximately 18 percent of the 
gas it consumed.  Of the remainder, approximately 37 percent came from Russia (44 percent of 
imports), 26 percent from Norway, and 19 percent from the Netherlands.6  Over time, however, 
amount of gas produced at home was expected to decline, while, according to one estimate, the 
share of imports from Russia could rise to more than 70 percent by 2020.7  Because almost all of 
Germany’s natural gas imports arrive via fixed pipelines, moreover, they could not be easily 
replaced in the event of a supply disruption.8 
 A second worrisome trend was the tightening of oil markets and the concomitant rise in 
world oil prices.  This problem was of a more recent nature, dating back only to 1999 or 2000.  
Through the late 1980s and the 1990s, oil prices had generally remained between $10 and $20 
per barrel, even dropping to less than as $10 per barrel in late 1998.  Because of concerted efforts 
to reduce production by the members of OPEC, the price subsequently rose steadily, reaching 
$30 per barrel in 2000.  After a sharp dip following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the 
                                                          
5BMWi/BMU 2006a 12; Götz 2004, 2. 
6BMWi/BMU 2006a, 12; EIA 2006; Götz 2004, 2. 
7Kemfert and Müller 2007, 7. 
8Müller 2007, 29. 
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world price resumed an upward course in early 2002 and continued to rise for the next several 
years because of unrest and disruptions in the Persian Gulf, Venezuela, and Nigeria.  By 2004, 
German industry was already expressing concern about the negative economic impact of high 
energy prices and urging the government to take action.9 
 Despite these negative trends, German political leaders evinced little concern as late as 
2005 about energy security in general and Germany’s growing import dependence in particular.  
Indeed, just 10 days before the September federal election that year, Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder presided over the signing of an agreement by German and Russian companies to 
construct a new gas pipeline underneath the North Sea that would connect Germany directly to 
Russian gas supplies.  Scheduled for completion in 2010, the pipeline would have an initial 
capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, half of which would be dedicated to 
Germany, with plans to later double its size.10 
 Shortly after the election, the new coalition government of the CDU/CSU and SPD 
demonstrated a somewhat greater interest in energy policy.  The coalition agreement called for a 
the development of a new comprehensive energy policy concept (Gesamtkonzept) and devoted 
nearly four pages (out of some 125 pages in the section on “Areas of Action”) to energy.11  
Likewise, energy policy was one of 20 or so topics addressed by the new Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, in her first general policy address (Regierungserklärung) on November 30, 2005.12  
Perhaps most significantly, as we will see, Merkel announced that she would be convening a 
national energy summit early the following the year. 
                                                          
9BDI 2004. 
10Goetz 2005. 
11Bundesregierung 2005a. 
12Bundesregierung 2005b. 
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 Even then, energy security remained a low priority.  The energy sections of the coalition 
agreement and the chancellor’s remarks seemed motivated much more by concerns about climate 
change and high energy prices (and their implications for economic competitiveness) as well as 
deep differences within the coalition over the future of nuclear power.  Whereas the agreement 
contained detailed and sometimes ambitious goals for renewable energy (increasing the share of 
renewables in electricity production to at least 20% and in total energy consumption to at least 
10% by 2020), energy efficiency (doubling energy productivity by 2020 compared with 1990), 
and energy research, it contained no mention of Germany’s import dependence.13 
 
2.2. Triggers of Action 
Rather, it was not until early 2006 that energy security finally, and rather suddenly, became the 
focus of a broader political debate.  The trigger was the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine 
that broke out at the very beginning of the year.  Much of the natural gas that Germany and other 
EU countries buy from Russia passes by pipeline through Ukraine.  Unable to reach a new 
agreement with Ukraine on natural gas prices and transit fees, the dominant Russian natural gas 
concern Gazprom cut exports to Ukraine on January 1.  Although Gazprom continued to feed gas 
intended for its other European customers into the pipeline, many European countries 
immediately experienced a sharp drop in the supply of gas. 
 Given that the disruption occurred during the middle of winter, when gas demand for 
space heating is high, European leaders responded with alarm and sought to broker a quick 
resolution of the dispute.  Although Russia was widely portrayed in the media as the culprit, 
German leaders were careful not take sides.  Nevertheless, the episode had the effect of focusing 
                                                          
13Bundesregierung 2005a. 
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German minds on the question of energy import dependence and supply security 
(Versorgungssicherheit).14 
 Although pressure in the trans-Ukraine pipeline was quickly restored to normal levels, a 
series of further events continued to raise questions in Germany about the reliability of Russian 
energy supplies.  On January 22, 2006, for example, mysterious explosions ruptured the 
pipelines supplying Russian gas to Georgia.  And the next January, following a dispute very 
similar to the one involving Ukraine, Russia cut off oil exports to Belarus, affecting 20 percent of 
Germany’s oil supply.15 
 Further impetus for Germany to address the question of energy security was provided by 
the European Union.  In March 2006, the Commission published a much anticipated paper on “A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.”16  In contrast to German 
energy policy during the preceding years, the paper placed as much emphasis on ensuring the 
security of the EU’s energy supply as on the economic and environmental aspects.  Although the 
paper did not come as a surprise to German officials - indeed, the German delegation to the EU 
had contributed to the process of developing the paper17 - it nevertheless both required the 
German government and provided the government with an opportunity to prepare a national 
response that assigned energy security the same priority as economic competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability in German energy policy. 
 
                                                          
14Umbach 2006, 13; Umbach 2007, 7; interviews. 
15Wikipedia, “Russia-Belarus energy dispute,” available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia-Belarus_energy_dispute (accessed August 24, 2007). 
16European Commission 2006. 
17“Deutsches Eckpunktepapier zur Energiepolitik in der EU,” attachment to Council of the European Union, 
6009/06, ENER 26 (Feb. 3, 2006). 
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3. Process: Developing a New Energy Policy 
How in fact did the German government go about addressing these rather precipitously revived 
concerns about energy security?  By chance, the principal vehicle was the energy summit that 
Merkel had announced the previous November, which evolved into an extended process.  What 
turned out to be only the first of three summits was held on April 3, 2006.  In attendance were 
the Chancellor; the federal ministers for economics and technology (Michael Glos), the 
environment (Sigmar Gabriel), education and research (Annette Schavan), and foreign affairs 
(Frank-Walter Steinmeier, represented by a deputy); and 21 high-level representatives from 
industry, labor, and civil society with an interest in energy policy.  Security of energy supply, 
along with energy prices, climate protection, modernization of the electricity supply, innovation 
and technology, and international cooperation, was among the half dozen central themes 
discussed at the summit, and perhaps the most prominent of them.18 
 The participants agreed to hold a second summit in the fall.  In preparation for that 
meeting, they also established three working groups that would present reports on (1) 
international aspects of energy policy, (2) national aspects, and (3) research and energy 
efficiency in September.  Of particular interest here is the composition of the working groups and 
the implications that it would have on the results of the summit process. 
 The Federal Republic has never had a separate ministry for energy matters, as in the 
United States.  Traditionally, energy policy had been viewed as a purely economic issue and, 
accordingly, had been the exclusive purview of the Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi), which has an entire directorate (Abteilung) devoted to the subject.  During the 
                                                          
18 Ergebnisse des Energiegipfels vom 3. April 2006.  Available at 
http://www.bmu.de/files/erneuerbare_energien/downloads/application/pdf/energiegipfel_ergebnisse.pdf (accessed 
June 3, 2008). 
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Schröder government (1998-2005), however, responsibility for renewable energies was 
transferred to the Ministry for the Environment (BMU). 
 An even more recent development is the involvement of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges 
Amt).  Prior to the Merkel government, the ministry had taken little interest in and had little 
capacity to engage in matters of energy policy.19  The new Foreign Minister, however, quickly 
signaled that his ministry was going to be fully involved in the international aspects.  Less than 
three months after taking office, at the annual Munich conference on security policy on February 
5, 2006, he spoke about energy and indicated the need for an “energy foreign policy” 
(Energieaußenpolitik).20  Then at the end of March 2006, he published articles on energy security 
simultaneously in the prominent dailies Handelsblatt and the International Herald Tribune.21  
And his planning staff reportedly prepared a paper titled “Theses on Energy Security Policy: The 
Contribution of German Foreign Policy.”22 
 These shifts in interest and responsibility were reflected in the composition of the 
working groups.  Each was to be co-chaired by representatives of two ministries and to include 
representatives from the other interested ministries.  Thus the BMWi was required to share 
leadership of working groups 1 and 2 with the foreign office and BMU, respectively.  And even 
though BMWi had long been central in the development of policy on energy efficiency, it was 
denied a lead role in working group 3, which was co-chaired instead by representatives from 
BMU and the Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).  Not only did this arrangement limit 
the influence of BMWi, but it ensured that the international, including security of supply, and 
                                                          
19Müller 2005, 181. 
20Steinmeier 2006a. 
21Steinmeier 2006b; Steinmeier 2006c. 
22Beste 2006. 
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environmental aspects of energy policy would receive strong institutional support. 
 The three working groups duly submitted their initial reports in September 2006 as 
planned.  As might have been expected, the reports devoted considerable attention to the issue of 
security of supply.23  The second energy summit was held on October 9.  The discussion at the 
summit was largely limited, however, to the results of the first and third working groups, 
reflecting deep divisions within the working group concerned with national aspects of energy 
policy.  The Chancellor announced that there would be a third summit the following spring, and 
the working groups were asked to prepare a further set of reports.24 
 The summit process was paralleled by two other important processes at the international 
level.  Germany was scheduled to hold the Presidency of the European Union during the first 
half of 2007, when the Commission was expected to present a detailed package of energy policy 
measures for consideration by the Council of Ministers and then the European Council.  In 
addition, Merkel was scheduled to hold the chairmanship of the Group of Eight, which would be 
holding its annual summit in Germany in June 2007. 
 Also of note were important developments within the government bureaucracy, which 
paralleled and reinforced the diffusion of influence over energy policy away from BMWi and 
                                                          
23Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 1 „Internationale Aspekte“ zum Energiegipfel am 9. Oktober 2006 (Sept. 25, 2006), 
available at http://www.bmu.de/files/energieeffizienz/downloads/application/pdf/ag1_internationale_aspekte.pdf 
(accessed June 3, 2008); Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 2 „Nationale Aspekte“ zum Energiegipfel am 9. Oktober 2006 
(Sept. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2001-2006/2006/10/Anlagen/2006-10-09-ag-2-nationale-aspekt
e,property=publicationFile.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008); Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 3 „Forschung und 
Energieeffizienz“ zum Energiegipfel am 9. Oktober 2006 (Sept. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.bmu.de/files/energieeffizienz/downloads/application/pdf/ag3_forschung_und_energieeffizienz.pdf 
(accessed June 3, 2008). 
24Ergebnisse des zweiten Energiegipfels - Vorschläge für die internationale Energiepolitik. und ein 
Aktionsprogramm Energieeffizienz (Oct. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2001-2006/2006/10/Anlagen/2006-10-10-energiegipfel-papier.h
tml (accessed June 3, 2008); Pressekonferenz zum Energiegipfel (Oct. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2006/10/2006-10-09-pk-energieg
ipfel.html (accessed June 3, 2008). 
 12 
toward BMU and the Foreign Office.  Within the BMU, energy issues had previously been 
confined to a single sub-directorate (Unterabteilung), which was responsible for both climate 
protection and renewable energy. Over the course of 2006, however, the ministry’s resources 
devoted to energy policy were greatly expanded.  Separate sub-directorates were created for 
“Environment and Energy” and “Renewable Energies,” and additional competency was added in 
energy efficiency. 
 A similar process took place within the Foreign Office.  Previously, conventional energy 
policy had been handled by a small office (410-9) within the division for international nuclear 
policy (410) within the Directorate General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development.  
By June 2007, the relative importance of conventional and nuclear energy had been reversed.  
Not only was 410 now called “International Energy Policy,” with nuclear issues handled by 410-
9, but it had grown to be the largest division within the directorate general.25  In addition, the 
directorate had added a new Commissioner (deputy director) responsible for international energy 
policy, and the Foreign Office had created an intra-ministerial energy working group (AG-E) that 
brought together representatives from numerous functional and regional offices. 
 
4. Outcome: The (Temporary) Eclipse of Energy Security 
The three working groups issued their final reports at the very end of the spring, and the third 
and final energy summit was held on July 3, 2007, somewhat later than originally intended.26  
                                                          
25Interview. 
26The three reports are BMWi/AA, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 1 „Internationale Aspekte“ zum Energiegipfel am 3. 
Juli 2007 (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.bdi-online.de/Dokumente/AG_1_Zus_Endbericht.pdf (accessed 
June 3, 2008); BMWi/BMU, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 2 „Internationale Aspekte“ (June 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-03-arbeitsgruppe-2-zusammenfassung
-und-bericht,property=publicationFile.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008); and Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 3 „Forschung und 
Energieeffizienz“ (June 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-03-arbeitsgruppe-3-zusammenfassung
 13 
Perhaps most striking about the results of the summit was the shift in emphasis that had occurred 
since the previous gathering.  Although the summary of the proceedings reiterated the usual three 
general goals of energy policy - security of supply, economic efficiency (Wirtschaftlichkeit), and 
environmental sustainability (Umweltverträglichkeit) - now the focus was on the creation of an 
“integrated energy and climate program.”27  As Chancellor Merkel stated, “with this program, we 
are taking on the central challenge of the 21st century, climate change.”28  In contrast, the 
importance of addressing concerns about security of supply appeared to have diminished.  
Instead, the conclusions reached at the summit suggested that Germany would be able to enhance 
its energy security through its efforts to combat climate change.  Certainly, few if any potential 
conflicts between these two goals were acknowledged. 
 This new or renewed emphasis on climate change -- and the corresponding de-emphasis 
of energy security -- persisted through the end of the year.  In August at Meseberg, the cabinet 
approved a 29 point Integrated Energy and Climate Program (Integriertes Energie- und 
Klimaprogramm, or IEKP).29  And in December, the cabinet adopted a detailed report on the 
plans for implementing each element of the program and proposed a comprehensive package of 
14 laws and regulations to that end, with the promise of a second, smaller package of additional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
-und-bericht,property=publicationFile.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008). 
27Ergebnisse des dritten Energiegipfels: Grundlagen für ein integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm” (July 3, 
2007), available at 
http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-03-ergebnispapier,property=publicati
onFile.pdf. 
28“Bundesregierung: Startschuss für Energie- und Klimaschutzkonzept” (July 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.bundesregeirung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/2007-07-03-energiegipfel.html. 
29Eckpunkte für ein integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm (n.d.).  Available at 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/eckpunkt-fuer-ein-integriertes-energie-und-klimaprogramm,property
=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf (accessed June 13, 2008). 
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measures to follow in the spring.30 
 As foreshadowed by the July summit, the IEKP placed much more stress on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions than on enhancing Germany’s energy security.  Although many of the 
proposed measures could reduce Germany’s energy imports, the purportedly comprehensive 
program contained few if any measures primarily intended to address Germany’s dependence on 
imported oil and natural gas per se.  Indeed, it said little or nothing on several issues of particular 
relevance to the security of energy supplies.  For example, it contained no measures intended to 
diversify the sources of Germany’s natural gas imports, such as promoting the construction of 
LNG terminals.  Nor was there any discussion of the possible contribution of nuclear power to 
energy security (as well as to reducing greenhouse gas emissions), implying that no consensus 
had as yet been achieved on revisiting the previous nuclear phase-out decision. 
  
4.1. Domestic Policy Measures 
Apart from references to promoting the export of German energy technology and active 
participating in the formation of the European policy framework, the essential fields of action 
(Wesentliche Handlungsfelder) identified at the July 2007 summit lay primarily in the domestic 
policy arena.31  Indeed, these elements had already been largely spelled out by the environment 
minister Gabriel in his April 26 statement to the Bundestag on the government’s climate policy.32 
Likewise, the IEKP emphasized what Germany could do at home. 
 One important area of action would be increasing energy efficiency.  Doing so would 
                                                          
30Bundesregierung 2007a.  For a useful summary, see also BMU 2007a. 
31Likewise, the SPD policy statement “New Energy” contained almost no mention of the external policy dimensions. 
32See “Klimaagenda 2020: Klimapolitik der Bundesregierung nach den Beschlüssen des Europäischen Rates” (April 
26, 2007), available at http://www.bmu.de/reden/bundesumweltminister_sigmar_gabriel/doc/39239.php (accessed 
June 16, 2008).  See also BMU 2007b. 
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allegedly allow Germany to reduce the consumption of all forms of energy and electricity in 
particular.  The July 2007 summit had reaffirmed the goal expressed in the November 2005 
coalition agreement of doubling energy productivity by 2020, and Working Group 3 presented a 
comprehensive action program containing dozens of concrete recommendations for doing so.  
Subsequently, the IEKP identified 30 different ways to reduce energy consumption, and the 
December package contained five detailed proposals for new legislation, regulations, and 
guidelines in this area.33 
 A second important area would be the promotion of renewable forms of energy, to which 
most of the rest of the package was devoted.  When fully implemented in 2020, these measures 
were expected to increase the contributions of renewable energy to electricity production from 
13 percent to 25-30 percent and to space heating to 14 percent, to increase the share of electricity 
produced from efficient combined heat and power (CHP) from 12 to 25 percent, and to increase 
the share of biofuels in the transportation sector from 6.6 percent to 20 percent by volume (and 
17 percent by energy content).34 
 Progress in each of these areas would allow Germany to reduce significantly its 
greenhouse gas emissions, thereby contributing directly to the goal of preventing or minimizing 
climate change.  At the same time, it would presumably reduce Germany’s dependence on 
imports of oil and natural gas as well, thereby enhancing the country’s energy security.  But 
these additional potential benefits were not explicitly spelled out. 
 
4.2. External Policy Measures 
                                                          
33Bundesregierung 2007b. 
34Bundesregierung, Bericht zur Umsetzung. 
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What had become of the external aspects of energy policy?  As noted above, the Foreign Office 
under Steinmeier had become extremely active in this area, which had been neglected under 
previous governments.  Moreover, these diplomatic efforts could be said to be directed primarily 
at the goal of enhancing Germany’s energy security, although they were also intended to 
promote its environmental agenda.  The biggest question raised by the final summit was how 
well Germany’s energy foreign policy would be integrated into the overall Gesamtkonzept, or 
whether the internal and external (environmental and security, respectively) dimensions of 
energy policy would proceed largely on separate tracks. 
 The emerging energy foreign policy had several more specific aims of relevance to 
energy security.  One was to help diversify the foreign sources of energy and transit routes so as 
to reduce Germany’s vulnerability to supply disruptions, whether politically motivated or not.  
Another was to promote a stable and open investment climate in supplier countries so as to 
increase the production and export of natural gas and oil in particular.  And a third was to 
promote greater energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources in other countries so 
as to reduce the global demand for fossil fuels.35 
 How were these aims to be achieved?  The overall approach propounded by the Foreign 
Office was to promote greater dialogue among producer, consumer, and transit countries.  As 
Steinmeier argued in early 2007, “energy security must be organized in a cooperative way - 
globally and in Europe”.36  He lamented that in this sensitive area, there was what he saw as a 
lack of adequate dialogue.  To remedy this deficiency, he repeatedly called for the creation of a 
system of cooperative energy security modeled after the Organization for Security and 
                                                          
35Interviews.  For a similar summary, see also Sander 2007, 22. 
36Steinmeier 2007a. 
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Cooperation in Europe, which would help to build mutual understanding and trust.37 
 Germany’s foreign energy policy would also have a strong EU component.  One purpose 
would be to reinforce and promote the domestic goals with regard to climate protection, energy 
efficiency, renewables, and market liberalization through action at the regional level.  But the EU 
was also seen as a crucial vehicle for pursuing the desired dialogues with other consumer, 
producer, and transit countries.  The Foreign Office very much supported the development of a 
European external energy policy that would enable the Union to speak with a single voice.38 
 Perhaps needless to say, of particular concern in recent German energy diplomacy have 
been relations with Russia.  Echoing the theme of German efforts to overcome the division of 
Europe during the cold war, ”change through rapprochement (Wandel durch Annaeherung), 
recent Germany policy toward Russia has been described as “change through increased 
interdependence” (Wandel durch Verflechtung).39  Steinmeier placed considerable emphasis on 
inducing Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, which would provide a solid, market-based 
framework for reciprocal trade and investment.  That failing, because of Russian resistance, he 
also strongly supported the negotiation of a new EU partnership and cooperation agreement with 
Russia that would contain a substantial chapter on energy grounded in the principles contained in 
the unratified Charter.40  Another German goal has been to help Russia to make improvements in 
energy efficiency, thereby potentially greatly reducing its domestic demand for natural gas and 
                                                          
37Steinmeier 2007a; Steinmeier 2007b. 
38For the most detailed description, see BMWi/BMU, Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe 2 „Internationale Aspekte“ (June 
20, 2007), 2-3 and 11-16.  See also Sander 2007, 22. 
39Interviews; Wagner 2006; Kempe 2007. 
40Steinmeier 2006b and 2006c; Steinmeier 2007b. 
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freeing up more gas for export.41 
 Despite the efforts that the Foreign Office had made to establish the importance of having 
an energy foreign policy, especially as a means for promoting energy security, however, such 
considerations were largely absent from the final energy policy documents agreed in late 2007.  
Only three of the 29 key points in the IEKP had any bearing on the external aspects of energy 
policy.  And these, too, emphasized the goals of climate protection and energy efficiency rather 
than energy security. 
 
5. Potential Problems with and Conflicts in German Energy Policy 
In view of these developments, how well is the new German energy policy likely to enhance 
Germany’s energy security?  Despite the heightened emphasis on climate policy, this would 
seem to be a fair question, since concerns about energy security were a principal motivation for 
the energy summit process.  Although the agreed policies will improve Germany’s energy 
security position in some respects, there are also reasons to be skeptical.  In particular, the policy 
(1) does not squarely face some problems, (2) may be based in part on unrealistic assumptions, 
and (3) lacks the tools to address effectively some energy security concerns. 
 One problem is the failure to address squarely the projected gap between demand for 
natural gas in the EU as a whole and assured supplies.  Even if the German market would appear 
to be adequately supplied by long-term contracts between energy companies based in Germany 
and foreign suppliers such as Gazprom, future natural gas shortages in other EU countries would 
have a negative impact on the German economy, especially if the EU makes progress toward a 
single, open gas market.  Gas delivered to Germany would be free to move to consumers willing 
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to pay for it in other countries, potentially resulting in higher prices and shortages in Germany. 
 And when the IEKP was adopted, it was not clear where all the natural gas needed in the 
EU will come from.  In 2006, the European Commission projected that total demand in the 25 
members would grow from 376 MTOE in 2000 to 530 MTOE in 2020, while indigenous 
production would decline from 197 MTOE to just 80 MTOE over the same period.  As a result, 
the dependence of the EU-25 on gas imports would rise from less than half to more than 80 
percent.42  Yet, according to one 2006 estimate, only about 75 to 80 percent of the projected need 
for imports in 2020 was covered by long-term contracts and underway import projects, leaving a 
possible gap of approximately 23 percent.43  The final report of Working Group 1 briefly raised 
this concern but did not offer an explicit strategy for addressing it.44 
 A second potential problem is that the assumptions and goals for domestic policy on 
which the IEKP is based may be unrealistic.  As a result, future German demand for gas and thus 
gas imports may be significantly higher than assumed. 
 During the last phase of the summit process, the analysis of the working groups was 
based on three alternative scenarios looking out to 2020.  One was based on the goals set forth in 
the coalition agreement, another assumed the deployment of even higher levels of renewables, 
and a third assumed a suspension of the nuclear phase-out agreement.45  Under all three 
scenarios, gas consumption was expected to decline slightly in absolute terms, although it was 
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expected to rise as a share of the total energy mix, from 22.6 percent to somewhere between 24 
and 26.7 percent, and even more as share of electricity production, from 11 percent to between 
16 and 23 percent.  As the final report of Working Group 2 noted, however, the absolute decline 
in gas consumption would depend on the achievement of the goals for energy efficiency and 
renewables, which were deemed by part of the group to be very ambitious.46 
 As noted above, the coalition agreement had called for a doubling of energy productivity 
by 2020 over the level of 1990.  Achievement of this goal would require annual increases 
averaging three percent for the remainder of this period.  Yet increases in productivity since 2000 
had averaged only 0.9 percent per year.  Thus one part of Working Group 2 regarded the 
assumptions about energy efficiency improvements as unrealistic.  And if energy productivity 
were to rise more slowly than projected, energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in 
Germany would decline more slowly than expected and natural gas consumption would actually 
increase, perhaps as much as 17 percent.47 
 Similar questions surrounded the assumptions about renewable energy production.  The 
coalition agreement had called for an increase in the share of renewables in total energy 
consumption to at least 10 percent and in electricity production to at least 20 percent by 2020.  In 
fact, these shares had already reached 5.8 percent and 12.6 percent, respectively, in 2006, and, 
perhaps encouraged by this progress, the renewable energy scenario prepared for the third 
summit assumed that they would climb to 16.8 percent and 29.7 percent, respectively by 2020.  
Yet Working Group 2 was deeply divided over the feasibility of such rapid increases, and should 
they prove to be unrealistic, especially in electricity production, the demand for natural gas 
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would almost certainly be higher than projected because of constraints on the use of coal and 
nuclear power.48 
 At least two other factors could make it difficult to reverse or even slow the growth in 
German natural gas consumption.  One is the pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  This 
will mean in particular addressing the use of coal for electric power generation in Germany, 
which currently accounts for about half.  According to the government’s climate policy, after 
2012, companies will only be allowed to build coal-fired power plants if they are able to 
sequester and store carbon-dioxide emissions (CSS) or if they have acquired sufficient emissions 
allowances through either the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) or participation in climate 
protection projects abroad.49  There are reasons to doubt, however, whether either of these 
options is realistic.  It is not clear when the technology for large-scale CSS will become available 
at affordable prices, Germany still lacks a legal framework for underground storage, and 
establishing one is likely to be difficult, if the problems encountered in dealing with nuclear 
waste are any indication.50  In addition, the emergence of prices for emissions certificates high 
enough to reduce carbon emissions would make coal relatively more expensive than gas. 
 The other factor is the planned phase-out of nuclear power, which until the early years of 
the decade was the source of 30 percent of Germany’s electricity.  As the contribution of nuclear 
energy declines, the difference will have to be made up for by either coal, renewables, or natural 
gas, and given the likely constraints on the first two sources, the logical alternative will be to 
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increase the share generated by gas, all of which will have to be imported.  A recent analysis by 
Deutsche Bank found that if the phase-out is implemented as planned, the amount of natural gas 
used for power generation would increase by 250 percent from 2005 to 2020, or the equivalent of 
one third of Germany’s total gas consumption in 2005.51 
 The Merkel government remained paralyzed on the issue, which meant that the phase-out 
would continue by default.  A future government could reverse the decision, although public 
support for doing so is not strong.  Indeed, the phase-out may have recently been accelerated and 
reinforced because of minor accidents and the discovery of safety problems, resulting in the 
temporary shut-down of two of the remaining 17 power plants and a revival of public concerns 
about nuclear energy. 
 Of course, increased German and EU reliance on natural gas imports would not be as big 
a source of concern if Germany and Europe could count on reliable access to adequate amounts 
of gas at reasonable prices from foreign sources.  Indeed, that has been a central thrust of 
Germany’s emerging foreign energy policy.  Yet here, too, there are good reasons to be skeptical 
about how much the situation could be improved. 
 One approach is to diversify the sources of and transit routes taken by Germany’s and 
Europe’s natural gas imports.  But the opportunities would seem to be few.  For example, much 
stock has been placed in the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline, which could link central 
Europe to gas fields in the Caspian Sea region and the Persian Gulf via Turkey.  At this point, 
however, it is not clear where the gas needed to fill the pipeline would come from.  Russia has 
signed contracts to acquire most of the gas exported by the Caspian states, while the political 
situation in Iran and Iraq currently precludes the possibility of transporting gas from or through 
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those countries.  Even if built and fully charged, moreover, the pipeline would alter the supply 
equation only marginally, given that its capacity would be just 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) per 
year, or just six percent of EU consumption.52 
 As a result, many hopes have come to rest on the development of new Norwegian gas 
fields in the Barents Sea.  Here, however, at least two obstacles have stood in the way.  One is 
simply the technical challenge of extracting the gas under the difficult conditions represented by 
cold temperatures, including sea ice, and deep water.53  The other has been an undefined 
maritime boundary with Russia, which shares the Barents Sea and has its own ambitious plans to 
develop the gas fields there.54 
 That leaves adding new terminals for the reception of liquified natural gas (LNG).  But so 
far, German energy companies, which import much of their gas from Russia, have shown little 
interest in building them.  According to German energy expert Friedemann Müller, “They prefer 
to minimize competition on the German gas market because they are vulnerable due to their 
long-term purchasing contracts with Gazprom.”55  Moreover, the one terminal under 
consideration, at Wilhelmshaven, would have a capacity of just 10 bcm per year, or just over 10 
percent of Germany consumption.  Thus in this area, Germany will be dependent on the 
decisions taken by and in other EU states to promote LNG, especially if the EU gas market 
becomes more liberalized. 
 As a result, the most important arena of German energy diplomacy is likely to be Russia.  
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Yet the energy summit documents suggest that the government has underestimated, or at least 
been unwilling to acknowledge publicly, the country’s likely future dependence on Russian gas, 
which could reach more than 70 percent of imports by 2020.56  There was certainly no mention 
of this fact in the final Working Group 1 paper on the international aspects of energy policy, 
where one might have expected it to appear.  Likewise, the 220 page report on energy scenarios 
prepared for the 2007 energy summit contained no discussion of where Germany’s gas is likely 
to come from in the future. 
 With regard to Russia, Germany faces two distinct, and somewhat contradictory, 
challenges.  On the one hand, there is the risk, however remote, that Russia might seek to use 
German dependence to apply political pressure or seek political advantage.  On the other hand, 
there is the danger that Russia will be unable to fulfill its contractual obligations.  The principal 
Russian gas fields are in decline, whereas development has only recently begun on promising, 
but often difficult, new fields, such as Shtokman in the Barents Sea.  Yet Gazprom, which 
produces 90 percent of Russian gas, has spent much of the money available for such investment 
on foreign acquisitions and preparing for the North Sea pipeline.57  In addition, the Russian 
government has recently sought to exert more control over foreign energy concerns, creating an 
inhospitable climate for foreign investment.  As a result, some anticipate a gap between, on the 
one hand, Russian production and, on the other hand, domestic consumption and existing export 
obligations by 2020 or even sooner. 
 Within the general strategy of “Wandel durch Verflechtung,” Germany’s principal 
approach to addressing these challenges has been to try to embed Russia in a multilateral rule-
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based framework for trade and investment based on liberal principles of market access.  Thus far, 
however, this approach has borne little fruit.58  Initially, as noted above, the foreign office hoped 
to induce Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and its important transit protocol, which 
would open up Gazprom’s pipelines to other potential suppliers, and that failing, to replace the 
expiring EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) with a new one that contained 
a substantial section on energy.  The first approach, however, was met by unwavering Russian 
resistance, and the foreign office has also discovered to its chagrin that the success of its backup 
strategy is contingent on support of its EU partners.  Negotiations on the new PCA were held up 
for 18 months because of Polish and Lithuanian objections and then put on hold as a result of the 
Russia-Georgia conflict in mid-2008and other obstacles could arise in the future.59 
 
6. Analysis 
Underlying the limitations of Germany’s emerging new energy policy as a response to concerns 
about energy security lies a deeper set of questions about the centrality of those concerns in the 
policy-making process.  In particular, why did energy security not move to the top of the policy 
agenda any earlier?  Despite troubling trends in energy prices and import dependence that could 
be glimpsed years before, the issue did not become a subject of a broader debate until as late as 
the beginning of 2006.  And why did energy security drop so precipitously in the hierarchy of 
policy priorities?  Certainly by early to mid- 2007, the issue had been de-emphasized in favor of 
much greater stress on the need to combat climate change. 
 To be sure, there may be some objective grounds for the limited attention to energy 
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security.  At the most general level, Germany finds itself in a relatively secure position.  It lies 
close to many of the world’s gas reserves, and it is well connected to them by pipelines.  As a 
result, Germany has been well supplied with gas at stable prices, and its anticipated needs are 
already covered by long-term contracts well into the future.  In addition, German companies 
maintain approximately 80 days of gas in storage.60  Even when crises have occurred, Germany 
has not been significantly affected.  Thus there has been no urgent need to take action.  Rather, 
the problem has been long-term in nature. 
 The same could be said of climate change, however.  Yet Germany experienced some 
record high temperatures in 2006, and the first half of 2007 saw the publication of a series of 
three prominent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the likely 
consequences and possible ways of mitigating them that were widely read in Germany.  As a 
result, the issue has come to be seen as more immediate and thus to dominate the political 
discussion of energy policy.61  Even though the most significant effects of climate change may 
not be felt for a long while, so the sentiment goes, the time to take action is now. 
 At the same time, however, more subtle and subjective processes may be at work.  
Arguably, one can detect a degree of complacency among German policy makers and a tendency 
to take an optimistic view of the situation that may not be warranted.  This has already been 
suggested by the favorable assumptions about potential increases in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy production underlying the IEKP or the foreign ministry’s faith in the ultimate 
willingness of energy producers to accept liberal Western market principles.  But it can also be 
seen in official views about the challenges posed by German dependence on Russian gas in 
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particular. 
 The concern that Germany’s import dependence holds serious risks and that Russia might 
use its status as a major energy exporter as a tool or weapon has been voiced primarily by 
independent experts such as Frank Umbach at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 
and Friedemann Müller, until recently of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.  Within the 
government, however, such concerns are viewed as exaggerated.  Typically, officials point to the 
fact that Germany has never had a problem with gas deliveries from Russia or even from the 
Soviet Union during the cold war.  Nor can Russia quickly find alternative customers, such as 
China, for the bulk of its exports.  As a result, officials argue, there is no reason to worry about 
Germany’s allegedly asymmetrical dependence.  Likewise, they maintain that Russia will be able 
to honor its contracts for gas delivery, even if it means buying more gas from third parties such 
as the Caspian states.62 
 If there is anything to this allegation of complacency and undue optimism, where could 
they come from?  More generally, what political factors might account for the overall lack of 
emphasis placed on the issue of energy security in the 2000s?  A promising place to begin is with 
the structure of government policymaking in the energy area.  As noted above, until recently, 
energy policy was handled exclusively by BMWi.  All government bureaucracies are 
characterized by particular biases, and the BMWi, for all its expertise on energy issues, is no 
exception.  Within the BMWi, one can discern an emphasis on the domestic dimensions of 
energy policy, a faith in the ability of markets to deliver public goods, including security of 
energy supply, and a tendency to represent the interests of German industry, especially the major 
German energy companies in this case, with which the ministry maintains close links and some 
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of which are eager to maintain good relations with Russia.63 
 Subsequently, the increased influence of the foreign office and BMU has, paradoxically, 
helped both to raise and lower the profile of energy security.  On the one hand, the involvement 
of the foreign office brought greater attention to the international political dimensions of energy 
policy, which often concern security of supply.  At the same time, however, the ministry has also 
been marked, since the shift to Ostpolitik nearly four decades ago, by a tendency to favor 
cooperative over confrontational approaches with first the Soviet Union and now Russia.  On the 
other hand, the growing clout of BMU has strengthened those who would devote more attention 
to climate change. 
 These bureaucratic orientations have been reinforced by party politics and personalities.  
The positions of the government ministries tend to be closely associated with the parties, or at 
least the wings of the parties, that control them.  For example, from 1998 to 2005, the foreign 
office was headed by Joschka Fischer of the Green Party, which could be expected to emphasize 
environmental issues.  Since late 2005, a member of the centrist wing of the SPD has been at the 
helm.  Not only that, but Steinmeier developed a strong interest in energy issues while serving as 
head of the chancellor’s office and Gerhard Schröder’s right-hand man between 1999 and 2005.  
In that position, he played a central role in the cultivation of close relations with Russia, which 
culminated in the agreement to build the North Sea gas pipeline.64  According to one analysis, 
Schröder and Steinmeier “saw [in Putin’s regime] Germany’s reliable economic partner, capable 
of providing stable delivery of energy resources...”, and this perspective seems to continue to 
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infuse German policy.65 
 Also important has been the interplay between Steinmeier and the ministers of economics 
and the environment.  In interviews, Glos of the BMWi has been described as not having 
strongly campaigned for the position and not being particularly interested in energy issues.  If 
true, these characteristics may have contributed to the diffusion of authority from BMWi to the 
other ministries.  In contrast, Gabriel of the BMU has been described as being very capable and 
having high political ambitions.  He has skillfully taken advantage of the heightened public 
concern about climate change to promote the agenda of his ministry and, in the process, his own 
political fortunes.  An example of this might be his April 2007 statement on government climate 
policy, which contained many energy-related measures and pre-empted the conclusion of the 
energy summit process.  In previous years, the efforts of the environment ministry to develop 
energy policy legislation had often been blocked by BMWi and potentially affected economic 
interests.  Now, it appeared that BMU was in the driver’s seat.66 
 Not to be left out of the analysis has been the chancellor herself, who had initiated the 
process of re-evaluating German energy policy.  Merkel took a particularly strong interest in the 
problem of climate change during the first half of 2007, creating a political opening for those 
who wanted to emphasize the issue.  This may not be surprising for someone who had been 
trained as a scientist and had served as the minister of the environment from 1994 to 1994 as 
well as the German delegate when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and drafted.67  But 
interviews suggested several additional, more political motives.  First, this was one area where 
she could appear to demonstrate political progress, especially during her chairmanship of the 
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Group of Eight, which had trouble reaching agreement on much else.  Second, and relatedly, it 
was a way to boost her popularity by responding to an issue of great public concern.68  Perhaps 
the most interesting suggestion is that she viewed the issue as a way to revive support for nuclear 
power, since the continued operation of at least the existing reactors might ultimately be 
regarded as necessary to reduce CO2 emissions.  Whatever her motives, the chancellor’s shift 
had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the hand of Gabriel, who could be her chief opponent 
in the next federal elections. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Despite the renewed emphasis on climate change in German energy policy, it would be 
premature to write an epitaph for energy security as a principal concern.  To the contrary, the 
subject seems certain to return, sooner or later, to the top of the policy agenda.  Prhaps the most 
important reason is Germany’s growing dependence on natural gas as a share of the national 
energy mix, a growing percentage of which will have to be imported from outside the European 
Union.  Whether and how quickly German gas consumption and imports grow will depend on a 
number of factors:  how quickly energy productivity and production from renewables increases, 
whether clean coal technologies can be deployed on a large scale, and the future of nuclear 
power, to name the most important.  But the projections underlying current policy-making efforts 
may be based on overly optimistic assumptions.  At the same time, more and more of Germany’s 
gas imports are likely to come from Russia.  Yet large question marks remain over Russia’s 
reliability as a political and economic partner.  Certainly, it would be unwise to disregard the 
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possibility of another shock comparable in magnitude to the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute that did 
so much to raise the profile of energy security in early 2006. 
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